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Genre and the Mediation of Political Economy in Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in 
France and Mary Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of the Rights of Men 
Indulging myself in the freedom of epistolary intercourse, I beg leave 
to throw out my thoughts, and express my feelings, just as they arise in 
my mind, with very little attention to formal method.1 
What does it mean to evoke a genre whose “freedom” eschews restraint, in a text which 
declaims heatedly against heterogeneity and disorder, and which equates spontaneity with chaos?  
What freedoms does writing need to seize in order to judge, discriminate and declaim? What role do 
the laws or conventions of genre, whether overthrown or enacted, perform in such tasks, and how 
might genre itself be reworked in the process? This invocation in Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the 
Revolution in France (1790) of the epistolary as the possibility of transcending “formal method” is 
perhaps the text’s only consideration of its form, despite its many extraordinary stylistic and 
discursive manoeuvres. But if, as Paul Hamilton asserts, Burke “was nothing if not a rhetorical 
strategist”, what strategy might lie beneath its deliberate evocation of a genre beyond generic 
restraint?2 This paper argues that part of the rhetorical strategy of the Reflections was to deploy 
genre in order to serve the text’s most occluded purpose: the mediation of what Burke saw as the 
truths and laws of late eighteenth-century political economy. 
To insist on the importance of attending to genre in Reflections might appear to present an 
especially challenging task, for the generic references and engagements made in Burke’s text are 
many and various. Even in its identification with the letter-form, Reflections aligns itself with a genre 
already marked by variety, looseness and openness, of which numerous subgenres (letters public, 
private, familial, political, historical, and so on) circulated.3 But Reflections also exceeds that already 
open and various genre: most notably in its length, and in its lack of a signature, but also in its 
resistance to the dialogic exchange which is the letter’s usual context: Burke’s is a text which seeks 
to close down, not perpetuate, differences of viewpoint and voice.4 It has some generic affinity with 
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the political pamphlet, but again its length exceeds that usual to this form, and its references — to 
theatre, poetry, romance, aesthetics, history, laws and sermons; to the classics, and to theories of 
human nature and society — extend its concerns well beyond politics. Critics have not only attended 
to the text as a public political letter or a familiar one, but have also studied it in relation to 
theatricality, tragedy, the sentimental, Gothic romance, epic, Swiftian satire, and classical rhetoric, a 
list which further attests to its multiple generic references.5 Such a list implies a formal looseness to 
which Burke privately admitted.6 Equally, while the full title of Mary Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication 
of the Rights of Men, in a Letter to the Right Honourable Edmund Burke (1790), one of the first 
critical engagements with Burke, suggests that she follows his use of the letter form, her text also 
exceeds its notional genre. Both texts are more open and heterogeneous than the essay, the 
modern form in which relative formlessness is recognised as a genre. Equally, whilst both Reflections 
and the Vindication lack a self-conscious sense of themselves as artefacts or organic unities in a 
developed literary sense, both deploy a good number of literary and rhetorical devices, together 
with writing which ranges from historical, political and religious concerns, to invective and reverie. 
Burke rewrites recent historical events as fiction or theatre; Wollstonecraft exposes the 
contradictions of his text like an exasperated literary critic, inviting generic comparison to a 
commentary.7 
Eighteenth-century genre theory offers some resources for understanding Reflections and 
the Vindication, in its accommodation of mixed genres, and (an instance of this), in its notion of the 
digressive essay.8 Ralph Cohen has observed that digressive forms mark “historical discontinuity”, 
“harmony or disharmony”, the “factionalism of society, and the dangers of this division,” and he 
links mixed forms to “defences of general principles of human nature by indicating the kinds of 
variations within any form”.9 This paper seeks to push further at the implications of these remarks 
for these two texts, to argue that, in each case, their loose, polemical form might appear to disrupt 
the settled generic order of eighteenth-century writing, to break new political or epistemological 
territory whose disciplinary shape has yet to be revealed, or which will emerge through the process 
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of their mutual interrogation. Even if genres are frequently or always mixed, the “ensemble of 
formal features” which marks out a genre as such, appears peculiarly scrambled in both Burke and 
Wollstonecraft’s texts, as though their writing is somehow in transition between or beyond 
established genres, deploying them in new ways to map out some object, of knowledge or history, 
whose outlines are not yet fully realised.10 Their seeming genrelessness might thus be understood as 
characterising the moment (or the epistemological field) immediately prior to the emergence of 
specialised modern disciplines at the end of the eighteenth century.  
This paper argues that the new object of knowledge determining the generic fluidity of these 
texts is political economy; it focuses on Burke’s Reflections, with some comparisons with 
Wollstonecraft’s Vindication, in order to make and explore such a claim. Burke’s engagement with 
political economy in the Reflections, although veiled, has been recognised by critics, most 
prominently by J. G. A. Pocock; Wollstonecraft’s preoccupation with commercial society is 
increasingly being noted.11 But although Burke’s text has been thoroughly investigated by modern 
literary and historical scholarship, the formal and generic implications of its occluded concern with 
political economy has received little attention.12 Burke’s broaching of economic concerns is delayed 
to the final stages of the text, but how might what precedes it be understood as mediating concerns 
which only become overt at that late stage? How might that later discussion determine, or disturb, 
the generic identity of the text as a whole? Such questions about the relationship of Burke’s text, 
and its genre or genres, to the emergent discourse of late eighteenth-century political economy, are 
more easily broached in the wake of Mary Poovey’s study of the role of genre in mediating and 
establishing modern commercial society, The Genres of the Credit Economy.13 Following Poovey, we 
might ask how genre mediates Burke’s discussion of political economy in a text which had as its own 
masked intention the shoring up of the political and economic settlements of late eighteenth-
century Britain. Comparison with Wollstonecraft reveals genre itself became a battleground on 
which arguments over the new political economy, and the establishment of commercial capitalism, 
were fought.  
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Burke’s attitude to political economy across his political career is complex, but within the 
Reflections, it is focused by what emerges as, for Burke, the central event defining the revolution in 
France. As Pocock reminds us, this is not the subject of the Reflections’ stylistic showpiece, the 
attack on Marie Antoinette at Versailles, but an economic event: the establishment of a newly 
unshackled operation of credit, through the circulation of a paper currency, the assignats, whose 
value was founded not on land, nor other present assets, but on the future value of church and 
monastic land and property seized by the French state. These aspects of a financial Revolution in 
France open a fault line in Burke, who, Pocock argues, defended the commercial society established 
by the Whigs in the early eighteenth century, but nursed concerns regarding commerce’s 
dependence on credit, and its potentially dangerous consequences. Such a fault line produces a text 
able, famously, to denigrate an “age” of “sophisters, oeconomists and calculators” whilst elsewhere 
praising the “science of speculative and practical finance” as highly esteemed by “the wisest and 
best men”.14 One of the many proliferating ironies exposed by the French Revolution, and with 
which Burke grapples in this deeply conflicted text, is that a defining aspect of the modern 
commercial state, its dependence on credit – now foregrounded in France but also long present in 
Britain – is one which is both, according to Hume and others, central to social and political cohesion 
but also, by the same token, carries the potential for pervasive economic, social and political 
disintegration.15 
Burke’s commitment to commercial society is effectively disguised in Reflections by the 
prevalence of pejorative market rhetoric, used early in the text to attack both revolutionary 
sympathisers in Britain (the Corresponding Society whose letters to France are like “counterfeit 
wares” sent to market), and the French National Assembly (who have misspent their stock);  in 
conjunction with the invocation of the manners of the chivalric age (understood by Burke, if not by 
Scottish conjectural historians, to have preceded the age of modern commercial society), and the 
general Gothicism of his style, Burke’s support for commercial society recedes from view.16 
Following Pocock, such apparent contradictions in Reflections might be reconciled by sketching for 
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Burke a precise politico-economic position: pro-commerce, and accepting of credit, but only when 
credit has a stabilising link to property, and to men of property as in the original Whig settlement — 
a link crucially undone in France. The question remains, however, of why, if this is Burke’s position, 
and given that the supposedly necessary relationship between credit and land is already well-
established in the writings of Hume and others decades earlier, it has to be excavated with some 
effort from the layers of obfuscation and rhetorical “drapery” which occupies Burke’s text. What 
does such “burial” of his economic beliefs and concerns say about Burke’s relation to political 
economy, and about the genre of his writing about it? What does it mean for political economy, and 
for Burke’s attempts to shore up British opinion regarding its own economic settlements, that his 
engagement with economic issues in this text is so hedged, shrouded, and delayed? Why are Burke’s 
negotiations of economic topics mediated by writing which is clearly extrinsic to political economy 
itself? And how do the genre choices he makes, the generic associations he invites and plays with, 
modify or stage political economy? 
To answer such questions, this paper reads Reflections, with some reference to 
Wollstonecraft’s response to it, to reveal how genre is involved in the struggle over political 
economy — its mediation and resistance; it argues that the fate of political economy in a 
revolutionary age would be decided in part by generic manoeuvring. Burke and Wollstonecraft’s 
texts both pose the question of the relation of political economy to other genres, and ask what 
genres will be used for the reception, dissemination and narrativization of political economy; both 
ask how ‘technical’ knowledge associated with political economy will be assimilated to other 
narratives or genres, and their accounts of human experience, society, labour and happiness. In 
Burke, this question of relation manifests as a problem in the formal organisation of his text, where 
explicit economic concerns are relegated to the end, overwriting a pejorative language of commerce 
dominant earlier. This split in his text arguably corresponds to the historical or interpretative 
question of Burke’s own divided relation to commercial society. To consider the generic 
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engagements of these texts thus reveals how, in them, the writing not just of revolution, but of 
political economy and its possible futures, was at stake. 
Contexts: Genre, Political Economy, and Value 
Genre theorists have long recognised the connection between literary form and political and 
historical change. Genres have been defined as “open systems” which “arise, change, and decline for 
historical reasons”, emerging to fulfil a social purpose in a community, to mark out different kinds of 
speech from each other, and to “complement, augment [and] interrelate [with]” other genres.17 As a 
“social construct” which “regularizes communication, interaction, and relations”, genre inflects and 
constructs social order and function; it also illuminates and articulates larger historical upheavals 
and reorganisations, including in knowledge, disciplines, labour, and writing itself.18 Genre’s 
importance, as well as radical instability, at the time Burke and Wollstonecraft were writing, is thus 
clear: at a time when the gradual formation of disciplinary and therefore generic identities was 
beginning to shape the proliferation of all kinds of writing throughout the eighteenth century, 
changes in genres were profoundly linked to the re-organisation of knowledge, society and writing 
itself. Cohen’s insight that generic identity depends not only on authorial intention, but also on how 
texts are read by their readers, means that genre emerges as a potential site of conflict, in which 
alternative readings of, for instance, revolution, or commerce, might be fought out. Generic analysis, 
therefore, doesn’t only provide us, as Clifford Siskin says, “with a way of understanding and 
articulating how behaving in writing connects to other sorts of social behaviours”; it also enables us 
to see how “behaving in writing”, or even behaving in genre, might rehearse or challenge, explore or 
resist, larger (social, political, aesthetic, economic) beliefs, attitudes, and actions.19 From this 
perspective, the pressure under which genre is put in Reflections speaks to the difficulty of Burke’s 
attempt to regularise social and economic relations. It also suggests that Wollstonecraft’s explicit 
and conscious countering of those attempts in Burke will involve a necessary engagement with his 
genre choice. 
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The history of eighteenth-century political economic discourse itself illustrates how genre 
tracks historical, social and disciplinary transformation. The emergence of political economy in the 
second half of the eighteenth century was part of an on-going process of discursive separation 
which, at the century’s end, resulted in the formation of discrete disciplinary identities and 
specialisms, including of political economy itself. The example of political economy reveals that 
disciplinary cohesion is arrived at via, and brings with it, numerous generic allegiances. Stemming 
from philosophical writing as a branch of moral philosophy, it mixes historical with empirical, even 
experimental writing; deeply informed by natural philosophy, its exemplary text, Adam Smith’s 
Wealth of Nations (1776), has been described both as a “prose georgic,” deeply invested in a 
particular narrative of labour, and as a text where abstraction provides the stylistic “key”.20 At the 
same time, political economy’s status as “experimental” knowledge, combining empirical data and 
general statements, has been shown to be shared with the quite different genres of lyric and essay.21 
As Poovey has shown, the emergence of political economy as a distinct form of knowledge, in a 
particular generic form (whilst itself still generically mixed), entails a reorganisation of the relations 
between itself and a range of other concerns, including the financial, the ethical, and the aesthetic; 
political economy incorporated, but also separated itself from, contemporary sociology, psychology 
and history.22 Its emergence involved choices about form: concerning for instance, the use of 
abstraction or systematisation; the use of a writing persona; the location and deployment of data or 
evidence; and the ways arguments are constructed from and around them. Political economy thus 
emerged through a negotiation of its disciplinary and discursive relations to, and differences from, 
other practices of knowledge and form.  
At the same time, as a relatively new object of knowledge, the status of political economy 
was still being established at the time Burke and Wollstonecraft were writing: it was both cited in 
parliamentary debate, and attacked in the radical press. The term ‘political economy’ could be 
understood to name an “emerging science of ‘the wealth of nations’”, or of revenue administration, 
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or more broadly the establishment of “the moral, political, cultural, and economic conditions of life 
in advancing commercial societies”.23 Debates over the direction, authority, and principles of a 
fledgling political economy took place within and as part of the French Revolution controversy of the 
early 1790s the context of both Burke and Wollstonecraft’s texts, whose debates were themselves 
characterised by generic diversity.24 Burke and Wollstonecraft’s texts participated in this process of 
contesting the nature and writing of political economy: given that engagement with political 
economy was not (yet) regarded as the sole concern of technical specialists; given that their 
exchange is initiated by Burke’s deep anxiety about what he presents as a revolution in political 
economy, an expanded system of credit; given too that happiness, an explicit object of political 
economy, is a concern of both. Their negotiation, it is worth repeating, takes textual and generic 
form, and their differences are in part over what the form, narrative or genre of political economy is 
going to be, as well as its relation to history, the aesthetic and so forth.  
The emergence of political economy in the last decades of the eighteenth century coincided 
with a larger crisis in the concept of value. According to James Thompson, political economy’s 
formation itself “constitutes a gradual working through of this crisis”: its ability to “describe the 
movement of capital, and … the very process of capitalism,” enables a “[g]radual consensus over the 
nature of value” to emerge.25 For Thompson, the “theorisation of nominal value,” and the 
“transition from real to nominal value in semiology and economics” constituted the “cultural work of 
this period.”26 As Thompson’s vocabulary makes clear – “describe,” “cultural work” – this 
establishment of political economy’s narrative of value occurred through writing and thus genre: 
writing’s means of measuring, assigning or implying value. But if the establishment of a new 
narrative of value would involve generic mediation, it might equally entail generic contest.  
 Struggles over the concept of value, which involved mobilising notions of aesthetic or 
literary value against market value, continued well into the mid-nineteenth century.27 According to 
John Guillory, this split between economic and aesthetic accounts of value was itself the 
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consequence of eighteenth-century moral philosophy’s bifurcation into political economy and 
aesthetics. In Guillory’s account of this split, political economy becomes a “discourse of exchange 
value” because of its inability to found value on the usefulness of an object, or an individual’s desire 
for it: instead, the nexus of consumption, desire, pleasure and beauty (in which value is articulated 
via a response from, or in relation to, the individual subject) is taken up by aesthetics.28 Thus, in 
solving the problem of value, and in establishing, in exchange value, a means of determining value 
through the mechanisms of the market, political economy exiles or alienates questions of subjective 
need or desire; however, it maintains the pretence, or ideology, that subjective need and desire is 
precisely what it serves. In Guillory’s words, the discursive separation of political economy and 
aesthetics marks political economy’s inability to “solve the problem of the relation between the 
individual subject and market society”.29 This “problem” might be formulated as, or marked by, a 
generic failure, a failure to find a form capable of successfully expressing that relation: from this 
perspective, political economy looks less like georgic, for instance, the genre which celebrates the 
individual’s relation to society through labour, and more like tragedy: the genre of the 
malfunctioning of the same relationship.30 Indeed, one of Adam Smith’s own accounts of the life of 
an individual in market society reads precisely as a tragedy of delusion.31  
 In 1790, Burke and Wollstonecraft are writing prior to the mobilisation of aesthetic value 
against market or exchange value described in these accounts: rather, their texts coincide with the 
complex decoupling of political economy and aesthetics, and the generic hybridity and unfixity of 
their writing makes sense in such a context. The generic looseness of both texts can thus be read 
both as a sign of the reorganisation of knowledge consequent on the rise of political economy, and 
as the means by which that reorganisation (whether as testing or contesting, as securing or 
challenging) took place. Value’s relationship to genre means that the ‘crisis’ or ‘struggle’ over value 
at this time was also a struggle over and within genre: a struggle over the kinds of genres whose 
accounts of value were admissible; over the relations of genres with each other; over their mutual 
areas of expertise and hierarchical relations. Given that generic affiliations are not passive, but active 
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choices made by writers, Burke’s Reflections and Wollstonecraft’s Vindication can be read as actively 
engaged in mediating or contesting emergent political economy precisely through their genre 
choices. Each text speaks to this situation in differing ways. The generic mix of Burke’s Reflections 
suggests a desire – shared with political economy itself, as part of its inheritance from moral 
philosophy – to maintain a fiction of the beauty of the social order through a sensationalist and 
aesthetic terminology and style which is at odds with the turn to political economy in its final stages. 
Its desire to secure an account of the individual’s relation to society is evident too in elaborate 
images founded on, variously, the family (“the little platoon”), the body (“relation in blood”), and 
property or law (the “mortmain”).32 As we shall see, the precariousness of such fictions is hinted in a 
rare moment when the drapery of Reflections is lifted to reveal the misery of labour: the “violence of 
production” whose “conflict” is otherwise “relegated from civil society”.33 The generic strategy of 
Wollstonecraft’s text meanwhile involves an attack on the gentlemanly persona which sustains 
Burke’s; a critique of political economy via an exposure of its failed utilitarian ideology; and a turn to 
the pastoral not as empty utopianism but as an evocation of a generic alternative to the tragedy of 
political economy.  
Burke and the Crisis in Value 
 Burke’s Reflections, which attempts to remedy what it understands as a revolution in value – 
where “splendour” has been given to “obscurity, and distinction to undiscerned merit”, where there 
is a “strange chaos of levity and ferocity” –  readily lends itself to being read via the crisis in the 
concept of value described by Thompson.34 As we shall see, it attempts to address that crisis in part 
by asserting the authority of Burke’s authorial persona, and thus wielding a formal tool against a 
“chaos” which extends to form itself. However, the text’s attempts to intervene in the crisis of value 
is rendered all the more complex by the contamination of its formal means with the very anxieties 
about value which it hopes to resolve. As suggested above, the particular crisis in value which 
Reflections addresses pertains to credit: the establishment of the political economy of France on a 
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credit system whose paper currency, the assignats, depends on property assets yet to be realised. 
Yet the crisis which Burke’s text inhabits, articulates and re-circulates seems far larger than this 
particular political economic fact. Burke’s fears, insofar as they are articulated, over the unleashing 
of credit, intersect with another set of anxieties, not about economic value, but literary or 
representational value: about how writing and communication alters or misrepresents value, and 
therefore about the circulation of opinion in all forms of paper, writing, and communication. These 
two sets of anxieties are interlinked further by a shared vocabulary: for Burke, “security” is founded 
both on economic assets, and in opinion; “credit” circulates in an economic system, but is also given 
to persons, beliefs, paper, and writing; and “interest” performs the same inter-discursive crossing.35 
Given the seemingly unavoidable promiscuity of the words which are Burke’s own tokens of value, it 
becomes possible to read Reflections so that the anxieties which he wants to address in relation to 
value, paper, credit and security in the economic sphere, speak too to the operation of value in the 
sphere of public opinion, with his own ‘letter’ as the paradigmatic instance of it. Thus a repeated 
horror of a “boundless paper circulation” which remains unfounded in any final ground of value 
speaks too of Burke’s anxieties about print culture, pamphlets, and public opinion – a culture within 
which political economy must establish and secure itself, not least through works such as his own.36  
The essential contradiction running through Burke’s text is thus his desire to use writing to 
secure value (of both kinds: security of a credit economy through the “security” of opinion), when 
writing is a medium, not an endpoint: it is a mode of circulation by which value is established, rather 
than a means of fixing it. Whereas property, in Burke’s view, offers a concrete form to counter the 
potential fluidity of credit and value, value in writing (especially, perhaps, in a form such as that 
ostensibly used by Burke, the occasional letter) is potentially transient, subjective, and contestable. 
Burke’s forceful expression of his character in writing may be read as an attempt to solve this 
problem by securing for his opinion-in-writing a more permanent form, but in doing so, the form in 
which that character is embodied, and with which it is identified – the letter – becomes emptied of 
significant generic function or meaning. The putative private letter morphs into an instrument to 
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manipulate public opinion, and rhetorical, textual, even generic trickery emerge as Burke’s response 
to value-crisis. Even a brief list of the narrative manipulations present in Reflections would note, for 
instance, how an account of the origins of the French paper currency is withheld until long after a 
sense of its horrors are established; how its presentation as a senseless idol is divorced from any 
account of its economic function; how scant attention is paid to the fiscal crisis which preceded and 
precipitated the Revolution; and how engagement with the economic detail of National Assembly’s 
actions is delayed to the very end of the text, when the emotional tone of alarm and horror is 
already dominant. But to make such a list is to assume that Burke is writing (logically structured, 
rationally ordered) economic commentary or analysis, but that is far from what his text attempts. 
Rather, Burke’s notional letter assumes a very different generic form, as a Gothic narrative with 
repeated evasions, obfuscations, draperies, mystifications, and sudden revelations of horrors; which 
plays strongly, even self-consciously on feeling, sensation, and affect; and where a repeatedly 
invoked figure of disembodiment (“mind,” “spirit”) is in constant search for an adequate form. 
Burke’s rhetorism, his play on the personal and affective, and his elevation of the authority 
of the expressive individual, have been read as part of what makes his text paradigmatically 
Romantic.37 But these textual manoeuvres might also be understood as, pace Hamilton, “rhetorical 
strategies,” which intervene in value-crisis, and whose effect is in part the reorganisation of genres 
into new relations and hierarchies. The foregrounding of formal features associated with rhetoric 
and the literary (personification, abstraction, reification, a subjective speaking voice) elevates the 
figural in general within the generic mixture of Burke’s text, propelling them into a prominence for 
his reader, and pushing at the limits of the letter form. But such (literary) devices have no value in 
themselves in Reflections – rather, their value is determined by their functional role in relation to 
Burke’s defence of political economy. To read his text for its literary art would be entirely to miss his 
point. By deploying literary devices in a narrative whose larger aim is to secure British political 
economy, Burke foregrounds one set of genres to serve another, which is rather more occluded; he 
seeks to solve a crisis in value by establishing a deliberate hierarchy between one set of values 
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(literary, aesthetic, imaginative, affectual) which serve another (economic), even though, like all 
relations in Burke’s text, such hierarchized relations are mystified and obscure. Burke’s desire to 
ensure the ‘beauty’ of the social and economic order – his deployment of aesthetic genres to gloss 
and drape his political economic purpose – echoes Guillory’s account of the deployment by political 
economy of a utilitarian ideology through which the operation of the market can be understood as 
an account of the ‘beautiful’ operation of society. As we shall see, Burke’s concessions to a 
seemingly necessary utility later in the text jeopardise the ideological possibility of beauty and 
happiness in the revelation of a starkly unadorned account of political economic realities. 
Viewed as a piece of writing which seeks to intervene in, and fix, the security of opinion and 
value, the remarkable hybridity and generic looseness of Burke’s text reveals its purpose: Reflections 
replicates, whilst seeking to resolve, the generic chaos which it sees in culture and politics at large. It 
shares the heterogeneity of the cultural hybrids, such as “political theologians” or “miscellaneous 
sermons,” which it deprecates; yet is able, within a couple of pages of attacking Richard Price’s 
“porridge” of mixed opinions and thoughts, to excuse its own lack of form.38 Such contradictions are 
controlled and contained by Burke’s authorial persona: whereas, beyond him, everything “seems out 
of nature,” in a “strange chaos” where others “quit their proper character” to meddle in world 
affairs, the “lack of formal method” in his own writing is justifiable as an expression of the organic 
functioning of the human mind.39 Burke’s persona is the one constant presence in an otherwise 
generically and thematically confused text, and it is the point from which emanates the sequence of 
abstractions — “nature,” the “human,” the “universe” — deployed in the text’s attempt to uphold 
order. Their inaccessibility is mediated by Burke, as the figure who evokes and articulates them. Yet 
the limited powers of such abstractions, and of Burke himself, as the embodiment of the power of 
human order, is revealed when, depicting the Corresponding Society’s communication with France 
as taking suspect goods to market, the market (which circulates difference indiscriminately, 
regardless of any value other than what it can itself find) is revealed as the supreme instance of the 
uncontrollable mixing, combination and disturbing of order which Burke’s text attempts to counter. 
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Given Burke’s position as a defender of the British market economy and of liberal trade, his position 
emerges as complex, even contradictory. A text which battles hybridity, mixture, and generic chaos 
by instituting order through the notion of the human — both particularised in Burke as the text’s 
speaking subject, and as more universally or abstractly evoked, as a mode of unified but natural 
variety — comes up against the market as a mechanism through which human activity comes to 
threaten the human itself. The irony is that Burke seeks to defend the human from a market 
mechanism whose indiscriminate circulation is the apotheosis of human activity itself. 
 
Credit in Writing: Persona and Style 
Burke’s defence of political economy thus comes up against the problem of the market’s 
distance, as a generalised system of circulating whatever it can find value for, from human 
determination. Just as property should secure any system of public credit (a link fatally undone in 
France), the market, including expositions or defences of its operation, for Burke equally needs to be 
subject to human authority. In Reflections, that human authority is embodied in the authorial 
persona of the gentleman, a synecdoche for the human, whose character and discrimination will 
intervene to secure value in writing against the chaotic circulation of opinion; Burke’s authorial 
persona is thus offered to the credit of his readers as a guarantee of order and value. As we have 
seen, the order (and disorder) of Reflections is identified as that of the author himself: Reflections’ 
gentlemanly confrontation with perceived chaos is thus carried out in a text where acknowledged 
formlessness is excusable human process. Although Burke concedes that a “different plan… might be 
more favourable to a commodious division and distribution of his matter,” ultimately Reflections, 
and its generic mix, is tolerable because it reflects the occasional disorder of the human mind, a 
disorder which can thus become an organising principle.40 As we shall see, however, and despite its 
elevation of the human as a principle of its own (dis)arrangement, Reflections eventually reveals the 
sacrifice of human lives which underpins market society. A text in which gentlemanly character is 
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synonymous with virtue thus also accepts the “dooming” of “so many wretches” to “innumerable 
servile, degrading, unseemly, unmanly … occupations” in order not to disturb “the natural course of 
things”.41 Even whilst, on the one hand, the human in the form of authorial character is mobilised to 
hold off revolutionary chaos, on the other, the human is explicitly dehumanised in the form of 
labour, in a sacrifice deemed necessary to maintain the “great wheel of circulation.” Rather than 
transcending generic difference to unite and harmonise, the human will be revealed to be subject to 
class and genre, as that on which difference writes itself.  
 Burke’s persistent foregrounding of the authorial persona is a significant difference with 
political economic texts as written by Smith and others, which seek to efface a sense of authorial 
persona by presenting putative facts, observations and analyses which purport to be convincing in 
themselves. Where political economic writing eschews the authority of the person in favour of 
impersonal evidence and analysis, Reflections seeks to extend to Burke’s account of political 
economy the credit which his own foregrounded persona elicits from the reader. The text’s origin as 
a letter reinforces the importance and authority of its speaking voice, but that status is complicated 
by the fact that, as Burke himself admits, the text’s length means that he has “far exceeded the 
measure of a letter.”42 Indeed, the invocation, and then suspension, of the letter form in Reflections 
arguably works to complicate the identity and modify the authority of Burke’s persona, who both is 
and isn’t engaging in private correspondence. Critics have noted that the foregrounding of a 
prominent speaking subject, through whom the reader’s textual consumption is mediated, is a 
device widely used in fiction, and the ostensible persistence of the text’s form as that of a letter, 
even when that initial genre choice has been exceeded, involves author and reader in a kind of 
fiction, in which the text both is and isn’t what it purports to be.43 In this arrangement, the reader 
extends credit to Burke’s persona for the sake of what he has to say, in the same way that fictional 
texts demand a suspension of disbelief, and an extension of credit. For a critical reader like 
Wollstonecraft, however, this unspoken arrangement between text and reader is just the first of a 
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series of uninterrogated historical settlements between authorities and subjects presented in 
Burke’s text. 
 Wollstonecraft’s sustained character attacks on Burke in her Vindication manifest an overt 
response to his authorial persona, and indeed his very person. Yet comparison of the prefatory 
“Advertisement” to her text with Burke’s note prefacing his, reveals too how differently each 
conceives the very act, or work, of writing itself. Strikingly, “leisure” is highlighted for both as a 
crucial condition for the act of writing, yet while Burke’s full response to the events in France had to 
wait until he had “leisure to bestow” on it, Wollstonecraft’s text is partially determined by her 
decided lack of “leisure”.44 Burke’s writing is thus presented as an act of disinterested gentlemanly 
leisure extrinsic to the world of work; Wollstonecraft’s by contrast makes the reality of the work 
entailed by and implicit in writing evident. One definition of professionals as converting “knowledge 
of the deep self into prescriptive expertise”; as owning “the right to define and exercise their 
expertise”; and as regulating others in the profession, even makes it possible to read 
Wollstonecraft’s critiques of Burke not as crude ad hominem attacks, but as assertions of writerly 
professionalism.45 Her attack on the gentlemanly behaviour which was idealised as the essence of 
professionalism “[f]or most of the eighteenth century” thus challenges the very culture from which 
Burke’s writing emanates by mobilising an alternative conception of writing, as work, and an 
alternative account of the identity of the writing subject.46 Tussles over the nature of writing, and 
writer, were thus part of the ground on which a larger struggle over the writing of political economy 
played out. As will be seen, the differing labours of the gentleman and the professional writer 
produced generically divergent accounts of the discipline which pertains to work itself: political 
economy.  
 If Wollstonecraft’s authorial persona illuminates writing-as-work, Burke’s authorial persona 
defends and mediates British political economy against the example of the French through 
mystification and obscurity, which even extends to style. In her study of the role of writing in 
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mediating the credit economy, Poovey suggests that “writing that embodied, interpreted, or made … 
value comprehensible helped individuals accept deferral, slippage, substitution and obscurity … and 
abstraction.”47 This description of the role of writing in familiarising readers with obscure, deferred, 
and mysterious operations of value is suggestive for considering style in Reflections. Burke’s 
narrative about value is a Gothic tale of arcane lines of inheritance; of values (political, economic, 
even human) which are never fully realised or comprehended; it locates human experience within an 
obscure geography of the ultimately ineffable. If obscurity, abstraction, and deferral of 
understanding combined with extension of credit, are at the operational heart of commercial 
society, Burke’s rhetoric is arguably a definitive writing style of the credit economy, in its enactment 
of precisely such modes, and in its weaving of a compelling tale through the combination of specific 
fact, mystification, and deferral. Here, Burke’s defence of commercial society operates even in his 
form, in his forging of an aesthetic and a writing style which plays with mystified value — a value 
which exceeds the comprehension of a single person, although it engages feelings and sentiments in 
obscure ways. Burke’s figures, his narrative excesses and lacunae, the swelling and bursting of his 
rhetorical bubbles, his playing on readerly credit: all this shows Burke deploying a writing style which 
echoes the operation of value in market society, producing a readerly experience which entertains 
the reader, but also obfuscates and mystifies her.  
 Reflections, then, does not simply mediate political economy in order to manage its 
representation and generic identity. In the operation of his style as a form of credit, through which 
value is both determined and deferred, the textual economy of Reflections replicates that of the 
credit economy itself. The stylistic efforts of his work, as in any rhetorical performance, are a means 
to get credit from his readers, but they also interpellate his readers as subject to the kinds of 
narratives he outlines. Whilst his style can be linked to the persona of the speaking subject, as a 
mark of his authority, education, learning — his ‘credit-worthiness’ — the work it does extends far 
beyond the figure of Burke himself as the controlling persona of his writing, to be continued by his 
readers. Following Poovey’s suggestion that “an imaginative writer’s style was … the provocation of 
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endless interpretations,” we can see that Burke’s style, like credit itself, doesn’t end a determination 
of what value is, but perpetuates it, so that his reader is caught in a chain of evaluations, conjectures 
and possibilities, though crucially in ways which are suggested and defined by the terms of his text, 
whose length, digressiveness, breath of subject, and sheer intellectual scale, meanwhile, threaten to 
baffle any attempts to master it.48 In this sense, Burke’s readers are caught in a textual economy 
their relations to which are hazy and half-realised, even whilst the text constitutes the arena within 
which readerly action must take place. Their relations to Reflections are like those of subjects in 
Burkean history — or indeed of subjects in political economy, as described in one of the rare 
moments in Burke’s text where the drapes of mystification are dropped and the outlines of a starker 
reality are glimpsed. Speaking of the relation between “acquisition,” order and government, Burke 
discusses “the power of acquisition on the part of the subject” as a delimited form of liberty given to 
the subject as part of the maintenance of the order of the larger political whole. “The body of the 
people,” Burke says, “must labour to obtain what by labour can be obtained; and when they find, as 
they commonly do, the success disproportioned to the endeavour, they must be taught their 
consolation in the final proportions of eternal justice.”49 The striving of labour for acquisition, the 
inevitable and constitutive disproportions between labour and success, the holding out of 
consolation in the vaguely invoked, but ominous sounding, “final proportions of eternal justice”: the 
experience of the subject in political economy parallels that of Burke’s labouring reader, similarly 
caught in exhaustive efforts towards unattainable goals, who is consoled by occasional glimpses of 
the sketched shapes of final settlements, dimly comprehended but never fully disclosed. At a further 
level of ‘mediating’ political economy then, Burke’s text, in the relations it offers between reader 
and meaning, reproduces the relationship of labouring subjects in political economy. Meanwhile, the 
work of readers as ‘labourers’ on the text, reveals that the notion of Burke’s authorial persona as his 
writing’s controlling point of origin or value is a fantasy. That fantasy of control is displaced by the 
success of his writing in prompting an “endless” chain of readings and interpretations from its 
reading subjects, which, like the circulation of capital in political economy, moves around and 
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beyond him. The style of deferral is the generic equivalent of what we shall see is the tragedy of 
labour in political economy: to labour in pursuit of that which never arrives. 
Tragedy and the Mediation of Political Economy 
Political economy, the obscure object of the Reflections, comes centre stage in the closing 
passages of the text, where Burke asserts that “the science of speculative and practical finance … 
stands high in the estimation not only of the ordinary sort, but of the wisest and best of men.”50 
Experienced elsewhere in the text as threatening and dangerous, the “science of finance” is here 
subsumed under the judgement of the gentleman, subject to his “estimation.” But the gentleman 
might not only contain the potential threat of a “science of finance;” he might also, of course, 
mediate it, possibly even under the cover of defending against it. Burke’s own language of surface 
and base, his defence of the drapery of “illusions”,  of “superadded ideas” from the “wardrobe of a 
moral imagination,” authorises a reading of his text on the same depth-surface model: indeed, it 
suggests the lurking existence of a necessary ‘base’ beneath the flourishes of its own rhetorical 
surface.51 The revelation of the determining “wheel of circulation” in the passage below, fulfils this 
requirement for substance beneath the aestheticized flourishes of Burke’s text. Yet whilst we might 
read Burke’s capitulation to the “wheel of circulation” as a moment of the slipping of his drapes of 
gentlemanly rhetoric, it is equally possible to see that this slippage, deliberate or not, is itself what 
mediates political economy, especially as it is revealed in generically familiar terms.  
The revelatory moment occurs in a crucial passage in Reflections which addresses the 
economic implications of the French appropriation of monastic property. The purported idleness of 
monastic life provides occasion for defending the idleness of a landed capitalist which, Burke says, 
“is itself the spring of labour; this repose the spur to industry” so long as profits are properly 
reinvested.52 In such terms, the idleness of the monks is fully justified; indeed, they are “as usefully 
employed” as the “many wretches” who are “inevitably doomed” to work 
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from dawn to dark in the innumerable servile, degrading, unseemly, unmanly, and 
often most unwholesome and pestiferous occupations, to which by the social 
œconomy so many wretches are inevitably doomed. If it were not generally pernicious 
to disturb the natural course of things, and to impede, in any degree, the great wheel 
of circulation which is turned by the strangely directed labour of these unhappy 
people, I should be infinitely more inclined forcibly to rescue them from their 
miserable industry, than violently to disturb the tranquil repose of monastic quietude 
[…] no consideration, except the necessity of submitting to the yoke of luxury, and the 
despotism of fancy, who in their own imperious way will distribute the surplus product 
of the soil, can justify the toleration of such trades and employments in a well-
regulated state.53 
Burke’s defence of monastic property (or landed property in general) concedes, or reveals, much 
about the economic system (the “course of things”) which operates here as the ground of nature and 
justice. Specifically, by making an argument which above all else is about utility (the phrase “usefully 
employed” is repeated three times immediately prior to the quoted passage), he betrays the extent 
to which political economy is not about the provision of happiness; indeed, as the experience of 
“miserable industry” shows, happiness is explicitly sacrificed to utility, as human lives are to capital. 
In this moment of ideological slippage, happiness emerges as a differential, a calculation, which is in 
fact unaffordable: what might be phrased as lamentable, or a tragedy, is instead weighed here as a 
political sum. However clearly Burke perceives, in the starkest of terms, the failed happiness of 
political economy’s labourers (“these unhappy people”), he nevertheless colludes in the mediation of 
political economy because of larger fears about disturbing or impeding its workings in what must 
remain a “well-regulated state.” In fact, it is Burke’s very acknowledgement of the miseries of labour, 
weighed against its contribution to maintaining the “great wheel of circulation,” which gives this 
passage its sense of political arithmetic. Thus Reflections capitulates to the logic of political economic 
calculation, mediating political economy in its starkest terms even at the very moment when its 
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greatest criticism has just been stated, when the drapery is cast off, and the full misery of labour 
revealed.  
Wollstonecraft, who commented that, if Burke’s “system” is true, the “gods, as Shakespeare 
makes a frantic wretch exclaim, seem to kill us for their sport, as men do flies,” was only the first to 
recognise that tragedy is what is offered, or mediated, in Reflections.54 However, few have attended 
to the specific way in which tragedy mediates the “system” of political economy here.55 If political 
economy is unable “to solve the problem of the relation between the individual subject and market 
society,” tragedy appears the generic expression of that problem.56 For Ronald Paulson, the image of 
the wheel of fortune strongly associated with it since medieval and Renaissance times suggests that 
“the basic mythos of tragedy” has always been used “to keep mutability under control.”57 In the 
passage above, mutability is controlled not through the wheel of fortune but the wheel of 
circulation, whose necessary turning, far from bringing change in fact operates to resist and exclude 
its very possibility, even at the explicit price of human lives. In the process, both tragedy’s relation to 
time, and the nature of tragedy itself, are rewritten, underneath the more overt political arithmetic. 
If the wheel of fortune suggests the tragedy of inevitable change, the wheel of circulation announces 
instead the tragedy of a specific instantiation of political economy which passes itself off (under the 
guise of the tragic) as fate or nature. Meanwhile tragedy is itself transformed in this act of generic 
mediation. Classical decorum restricted tragedy to characters of high social rank, but here political 
economy enables tragedy to extend a more inclusive embrace.58 Equally, if tragedy, as a means to 
understand change, was previously oriented to history or the past, here it is redeployed to colonise 
the future with “the necessity of submitting to the yoke of luxury, and the despotism of fancy”.  
Tragedy’s familiar form thus enables Burke to mediate political economy, in the process 
inaugurating generic change on both fronts. Indeed, tragedy mediates political economy even at the 
level of language in this passage. Phrases which encapsulate the tragic predicament of labour — the 
“wheel of circulation” and the “natural course of things” — are derived from political economic 
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discourse. The phrase “natural course of things” is used at least eight times in Wealth of Nations, 
and also appears in the prized 1755 manuscript in which Smith founded his non-interventionist 
economic system precisely as the “natural course of things.” “Wheel of circulation” also appears in 
Wealth of Nations, where it describes the circulation of money, a process carefully distinguished 
from the circulation of goods to which Burke’s use of the phrase points.59 In Burke, the phrase 
becomes more abstract and figural, a metaphor for the “system” of political economy itself. Elevated 
to become less descriptive and more imperative than in Smith, it writes political economy as a 
tragedy in presenting the unstoppable production of goods as a wheel on which human lives are 
visibly broken.  
The overt presence of political economic language here prompts the question raised earlier 
in this paper: why Burke’s political economic beliefs, stated so starkly here, are obscured elsewhere 
in Reflections. The answer is surely because it is apparent now that Burke is not simply defending the 
credit economy, secured on property, established by early eighteenth-century Whigs, but a labour 
economy in thrall to the circulation of goods. Between these two alternatives, a revolution has taken 
place in the nature of property, which no longer simply secures credit, but now stimulates 
circulation and itself circulates. If property previously anchored and secured political economy, as 
the material form of the human, now, the production of property-as-goods, at the expense of 
human lives, dominates. Value has been unbound from the gentlemanly, to become a function of 
the “wheel of circulation” served by human labour, and apparent fixity has given way to circulation, 
in a tragedy which serves utility, not happiness. The threat this poses to ‘gentlemanliness’ surely 
requires its being obscured as much as possible. For the revelation of the generic identity of political 
economy as tragedy — the genre of human inadequacy in the face of larger determining historical 
forces — destabilises the power of the gentleman, as the embodiment of the human, as an 
organising point to hold off the chaos which Reflections confronts. Rather than a synecdoche for 
human-in-general, the gentleman is now revealed as a class-specific identity, able to view with 
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resignation the sacrifice of other human lives; the human itself is revealed not as a unifying point of 
transcendence but subject to class and generic difference.  
The fate of the gentleman reveals the extent to which Burke’s text itself undergoes the kind 
of generic change which it elsewhere laments. A text which has been marked by the restless 
circulation of disembodied abstractions becomes a stark account of the determining conditions of 
history, an irrefutable narration of the material experience of labour. Tragedy is revealed to be not 
the fall of a queen, but the experience of humanity in general under irresistible economic conditions. 
Indeed, one possible reading of Burke’s famous outpouring over Marie Antoinette might be to 
understand it as displacement, a transference of the affective response which is notably lacking from 
his impartial tones here at the text’s end. Lack of feeling was one accusation levelled at Burke by 
Wollstonecraft, who claimed that for misery “to reach your heart” it must “have its cap and bells; 
your tears are reserved … for the declamation of the theatre, or the downfall of queens.”60 She 
accuses Burke of reserving feeling, the mark of the human, for the formal realm of the aesthetic, 
enacting a boundary between that and real life. Wollstonecraft resists Burke’s separation of the 
aesthetic and affective from the realms of political and economic life, and reasserts the possibility 
that feeling and happiness might be reconciled with the material conditions of life. Her suggestion 
that “large estates be divided into small farms,” counters the tragedy of the Burkean vision with a 
turn to the pastoral, to cast the economic in a different genre, where feeling and happiness might be 
better accommodated.61 If Reflections eventually capitulates to the emergence of political economy 
as a science to be mediated by the aesthetic, Wollstonecraft’s turn to the pastoral asserts the 
possibility of resistance to that separation.  
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